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ABSTRACT
Whether or not unilateral humanitarian intervention should be considered 
“legal” in public international law remains unresolved, and is apparently 
unresolvable. (Unilateral humanitarian intervention here refers to 
international military intervention by one or more countries in the territory 
of another, in the absence of clear Security Council mandate, and designed 
to protect a population under immediate threat of violence.) This article 
argues that, when seen from the point of view of the world’s most 
vulnerable populations, the humanitarian intervention question is in fact the 
most significant question in contemporary international law. Its resolution is 
also key to the consistent and coherent functioning of the international legal 
regime. Especially when comparing recent events in Libya to other long 
running—but neglected—conflicts, international law seems to have 
contented itself with an ad hoc, even arbitrary, approach to the question of 
when military intervention on behalf of a besieged population is permitted. 
By contrast, a disproportionate amount of intellectual energy is directed at 
post-conflict criminal tribunals, which are far less important to the 
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international rule of law than a strong, positive doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention would be. 
The article reviews the history of U.N. Charter “dysfunction,” in that the 
international military force intended to meet threats to international peace 
and security was never created, and the problem of gridlock on the Security 
Council—although certainly less acute now than during the Cold War—was 
never fully resolved. The result, as the article details, has been a string of 
tragedies, in which vulnerable populations are often left to fend for 
themselves in the face of brutal violence. The article pays particular 
attention to those situations, as in Uganda, where populations have been 
terrorized by small, low tech military bands, whose violent activities would 
have been quite easy to put a stop to, but where the international community 
has felt no compulsion to step in. Such conflicts often run for many years. 
The article discusses in detail the evolution of international thought on 
the matter of unilateral humanitarian intervention. In particular, it notes 
recent attempts to reframe the concept as an international “responsibility to 
protect.” The argument is made that this change is attractive in the sense of 
linking military intervention with the idea of “rights” belonging to those 
under threat; however, it might prove less effective than the more robust 
notion of a unilateral right of nations to intervene on an as-needed basis. 
The article makes the further argument that it is a grave mistake to treat 
the issue of unilateral humanitarian intervention as just another thorny issue 
in international law; whereas in fact a viable legal system simply cannot 
allow genocidal events to run their course. The article also reviews the old 
arguments as to whether international law is in fact “law” as we understand 
that term, and suggests that a negative response to that question might 
refocus the scholarly mind on revamping the Charter system to ensure clear 
protective responses to genocidal threats. 
I. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: WHY IS THIS KEY ISSUE LEFT OPEN-
ENDED?
The question of whether or not international law “allows” for 
humanitarian intervention has been left up in the air for decades.1
 1. Humanitarian intervention here refers to the armed intervention by one country 
or a group of countries within the territory of another. Controversy arises over the legality of 
doing so in the absence of explicit Security Council authorization, for the purpose of 
protecting people who are in imminent danger of being harmed, whether by their own 
government or some other force. The operative elements here are; (1) that the territorial 
integrity of a state is being violated, and (2) that the international community has not given 
its specific approval for the action. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Davis, From Ideology to 
Pragmatism: China’s Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 44 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 221 (2011) ([H]umanitarian intervention is defined as the use 
of force by a state (or group of states) in another sovereign state’s territory to protect the host 
state’s citizens from gross human rights abuses, mass atrocities, crimes against humanity, or 
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International jurists and commentators appear to be relatively content to let 
this matter remain unresolved despite its central significance for the 
international legal system.2 In fact, whether or not humanitarian intervention 
is to be prohibited, tolerated, or even mandated, is a far more important 
question than others that seem to gain more intellectual attention from 
international legal scholars.3 The answer to this “humanitarian intervention” 
conundrum determines whether extremely vulnerable people in situations of 
violent conflict have a recognized right to be protected against attack—
surely a more pressing question (as perceived by those who suffer) than 
whether a small handful of individual war criminals will face international 
prosecution, for instance.4 And yet, the question of the legality of 
humanitarian intervention is generally treated as a thorny if obscure 
dilemma, about which opinions simply differ. There is little apparent 
urgency with respect to the need to solve this matter once and for all in the 
interests of the most vulnerable and of the international legal system itself. 
Where many commentators seem to get it wrong is in treating 
humanitarian intervention and its legality as just one of many difficult 
questions in international law, whereas it is the question from the point of 
view of those most directly affected by failures in the international rule of 
law. It is well established that the system envisioned by the United Nations 
genocide. Thus defined, humanitarian intervention is in direct tension with the norms of state 
sovereignty and nonintervention that arose out of the settlement at Westphalia in 1648.). 
 2. See Ian Hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an 
Incoherent World, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 293, 293 (2011) (“The debate suggests that 
humanitarian intervention is either legal or illegal depending on one’s understanding of how 
international law is constructed, changed and represented. Since these questions cannot be 
answered definitively, the uncertainty remains fundamental, and the legality of humanitarian 
intervention is essentially indeterminate.”). See also Davis, supra note 1, at 221 (“The legal 
status of humanitarian intervention remains unsettled under international law.”). 
 3. This article will argue that the question of the legality of humanitarian 
intervention in the absence of U.N. authorization is the most fundamental question of 
international law, of far more significance to real people around the world than matters that 
receive far more attention by international lawyers, as humanitarian intervention involves 
effective action on the prevention side. See JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: WHO SHOULD INTERVENE? 2 (2010) (regarding a trend 
in the direction of recognizing the legality of humanitarian intervention and making the 
argument that despite the lack of legal clarity on the issue, many now believe that 
intervention to prevent mass killing may be justified.) (“Indeed, it is much harder to find 
someone who completely supports non-intervention nowadays. The lack of action in Rwanda 
. . . and the subsequent genocide has had a massive impact on the theory and practice of 
intervention. Even those who are deeply suspicious of armed intervention and deeply 
skeptical about its prospects of success may still admit that it might, in theory, be justified 
when a humanitarian crisis is sufficiently serious.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Margaret M. DeGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection 
at the International Criminal Court, MICH. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012) (pointing out that 
“[t]he International Criminal Court . . . has the mandate to ‘end impunity’ for serious 
international crimes around the world but the budget to prosecute only a few cases per year. 
This high degree of selectivity represents one of the greatest threats to the Court’s 
legitimacy.”) (internal quotations added). 
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(U.N.) Charter—with the Security Council identifying threats to 
international peace and security, and when needed calling forth an 
international military response—never functioned as it should have.5
Careful reading of the U.N. Charter makes plain that this system of 
surveillance and ready response by the international community was to be at 
the heart of a global system that aimed to stamp out conflict before it had a 
chance to spread.6 The profound and ongoing importance of this 
“constitutional” failure at the heart of the international regime has not 
received sufficiently coherent and sustained attention.7 Few seem to state 
clearly that, in the face of this functional defect, either the Charter should be 
revised (to clearly allow for and even demand humanitarian intervention 
 5. See U.N. Charter art. 42 (enabling the Security Council to “take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockage, and other operations by air, sea 
or land forces . . . of the United Nations”). See U.N. Charter art. 43, para. 1(calling on “All 
Members of the United Nations” to make armed forces and other services available to the 
Security Council “for purposes of maintenance of international peace and security”). But see
W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J.
INT’L L. 279, 279-80 (1985) for a formulation of the issue that “special agreements” 
necessary for such action were never carried out (“[T]he security system of the United 
Nations was premised on a consensus between the permanent members of the Security 
Council. Lamentably, that consensus dissolved early in the history of the organization . . . . 
The international political system has largely accommodated itself to the indispensability of 
coercion in a legal system, on the one hand, and the deterioration of the Charter system, on 
the other . . . .”).  
 6. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, International Law in Perplexing Times, 25 MD. J. INT’L L.
11, 15 (2010) (including in his symposium remarks that “the aftermath of World War II saw 
an intensification of many of the doctrinal and institutional trends that began during the inter-
war years. In the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, states agreed to ban the use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of states, with limited exceptions, including 
when a state is responding in self-defense to an armed attack and when the use of force is 
authorized by the U.N. itself. Hence the League of Nations’ failures prompted states to 
modify, rather than reject, the project to build an international collective security system”).  
 7. See, e.g., Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized 
Humanitarian Intervention, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1286-87 (2010) (stating that the three 
principal arguments in favor of humanitarian intervention are somehow made outside 
international “law,” namely: (1) that the Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force 
is only violated when the territorial integrity or political independence of the state are 
implicated by the use of force; (2) that when the Security Council fails to realize one of its 
principal purposes, such as protecting human rights, then unauthorized use of force by a U.N. 
Member does not violate the terms of the U.N. Charter; and (3) that customary international 
law provides a right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention). Mohamed advocates 
holding to a firmer line with respect to what he/she sees as the clear legal rule against such 
intervention. However, the real problem is that without the U.N. providing the kind of hard 
and collective military option to protect people suffering mass human rights abuses—as was 
clearly allowed for in the Charter—then it is difficult to understand the “law” as mandating 
that individual states refrain from taking military steps in defense of suffering people. Under 
these circumstances, the basic structure of the “law” has been fundamentally compromised. 
Id.
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under certain circumstances), and/or that the formation of an active global 
“police force” should be revived in the post-Cold War age.8
The U.N. Charter is the most fundamental document of postwar 
international law, amounting almost to a global Constitution.9 To a degree 
that often seems insufficiently appreciated, its main goal is the suppression 
of armed conflict, if necessary, through reliance on targeted multilateral 
force.10 The full operation of the Charter was obviously impaired by the 
ideological gridlock of the Cold War, during which the permanent members 
of the Security Council could not agree on issues relating to the coordinated 
use of force.11 It should be noted that these ideological disagreements have 
persisted to some extent into the post-Cold War era.12 It may be that most 
commentators and policy makers have simply accepted this contradictory 
and unsatisfactory state of affairs in the face of political reality and with the 
resigned awareness that fundamental revision is just not politically feasible. 
The Charter as written is unambiguous, though: the international system 
eschewed unilateral acts of violence by particular states against other states, 
 8. See A NEW CHARTER FOR A WORLDWIDE ORGANISATION? 117 (Maurice Bertrand 
& Daniel Warner eds., 1996) (“That volume, a provision-by-provision revision of the UN 
Charter, calls for the establishment of what has been called a limited world government; but 
since this limited world government implements complete and general disarmament, 
possesses a standing UN police force, compels compulsory jurisdiction before courts and 
establishes a world development authority and other centralized organs, that project is a 
radical revision of the UN.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1 PACE 
Y.B. INT’L L. 61 (1989) (making the point that the U.N. Charter is a treaty, but also a 
constitution for the international community). 
 10. See Grant L. Willis, Security Council Targeted Sanctions, Due Process and the 
1267 Ombudsperson, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 673, 676-77 (2011) (“In 1945 the United Nations 
was established as an international organization whose raison d’etre was the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The U.N. system was formulated to deal with states, which 
are the principal subjects of international law, and the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) was ascribed the power to take actions that are binding on states in response to 
threats to international peace and security. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
the Security Council may take enforcement measures to maintain international peace and 
security. Such measures range from economic and/or other sanctions not involving the use of 
armed force to international military action.”). See also Mohamed, supra note 7, at 1282 
(“[A]lthough the promotion of human rights constituted a significant focus of the United 
Nations, the aim of the creators of the new organization was, above all, the suppression of 
armed conflict. A right of humanitarian intervention, therefore, did not figure into the UN 
Charter.”). 
 11. See Reisman, supra note 5, at 280. 
 12. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the 
Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 870 (2005) (“The U.N. regime was largely an attempt 
to bring war and the use of force within an international legal framework. But it has proven 
incapable of preventing wars: the twentieth century was one of the bloodiest, and the twenty-
first is not shaping up to be much better. The Cold War undermined whatever hope there 
might have been that the Security Council would be able to play a moderating role during the 
early decades of the U.N. The NATO bombings in Kosovo and the American invasion of 
Iraq without Security Council approval have demonstrated further the limits of international 
law in preventing war in the post-Cold War era.”). 
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except in clear self-defense, while accepting that coordinated use of military 
force might be necessary to achieve the overarching goals of international 
peace and security.13 Viewed systemically, however, it is plain that the 
global regime has failed to adopt a predictable set of humanitarian responses 
to outbreaks of mass violence (perpetrated by state and non-state actors) 
that, of course, continue to occur.14
A central myth of international legal analysis is that we are in the age of 
“international institutional building,” and that international law is gradually 
becoming more “enforceable.”15 As evidence of this new enforceability, the 
emphasis on post-conflict criminal prosecutions takes up an inordinate 
amount of intellectual energy within the discipline of international law.16 On 
the one hand, such an ex-post prosecution focus is disproportionate in 
itself.17 On the other hand, regarding the lack of clarity around the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention, there is little more than an intellectually 
disorganized mission creep approach, in which no one knows exactly 
whether armed intervention on behalf of endangered civilians is to be 
applauded or denounced.18
 13. See, e.g., James A. Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition 
of the Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 215, 215-16 (2011) (conceding that “the unilateral 
use of force is a fundamental aspect of the United Nations (U.N.) era system for governing 
the relations between states” and questioning whether this prohibition should be considered 
as having jus cogens status). 
 14. See Hurd, supra note 2, at 297 (“Disagreements about deep points of 
international law, including how law changes in response to practice, how treaties are 
interpreted, and the meaning of compliance and noncompliance in particular cases, overlay a 
remarkable consensus that humanitarian intervention is an important tool for states and 
international organizations whether it is legal or not. The disagreements over how 
international law works, alongside a consensus in favor of the practice regardless of its 
legality, suggests that humanitarian intervention is likely to exacerbate the ambiguities 
inherent in the idea of the rule of law for sovereign states.”) (emphasis in original).  
 15. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Making the State Do Justice: Transnational 
Prosecutions and International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-Armed Conflict 
Guatemala, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 79, 81 (2008) (“Much of the international institution- building 
over the last two decades in the field of human rights and international humanitarian law has 
been aimed at overcoming the impunity of powerful, untouchable actors. An emerging 
international norm holds that when large-scale humanitarian law violations have been 
committed, action must be taken to deal with the past, including measures to allow victims to 
find out what happened to their loved ones, to sanction those responsible, and to provide 
redress.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Mark S. Ellis, Combating Impunity and Enforcing Accountability as a 
Way to Promote Peace and Stability—The Role of International War Crimes Tribunals, 2 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 111 (2006). 
 17. See, e.g., Gerry J. Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes 
Trials, 60 ALB. L. REV. 801 (1997). 
 18. See Robert P. Chatham, Defense of Nationals Abroad: the Legitimacy of Russia’s 
Invasion of Georgia, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 75, 92 (2011) (describing the legality of 
humanitarian intervention as “tenuous at best”). Compare Robert Marquand, How Libya’s 
Qaddafi Brought Humanitarian Intervention Back in Vogue, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
(March 28, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0328/How-Libya-s-
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A vexing result of this situation is that some of the most egregious 
violations of human rights are left unaddressed—even those that could be 
rectified with relatively little investment of international time and 
attention—while others are responded to with eagerness.19 Recent events in 
Libya fall into the latter category.20 One could argue that what distinguishes 
Libya from, say, Uganda or southern Sudan is the long-standing Western 
desire to drive Muammar Qaddafi from power. However, such opportunistic 
considerations seem an unattractive basis on which to advance international 
law and policy. International law purports to be “law,” in the sense of 
applying principles derived from the realm of rationality, even handedness, 
and fairness. Leaving the basic matter of humanitarian protection 
unresolved is an invitation to ad hoc solutions that inevitably contribute to 
international insecurity and unpredictability. 
A. What the U.N. Charter Actually Said  
Despite some developmental inertia, international law can claim its 
constitutional milestones. The creation of the United Nations in 1945 was 
meant to make serious and unambiguous inroads into the capacity of 
sovereign states to engage in warfare as a means of resolving conflict.21 No 
one reading the U.N. Charter could mistake the fact that the U.N. had, as its 
primary mission, to severely restrict recourse to the unilateral use of force to 
Qaddafi-brought-humanitarian-intervention-back-in-vogue (“[That the international 
community’s decision to intervene in Libya] has returned the idea of humanitarian 
intervention to the world stage. It’s a notion that has lain dormant—and was discredited in 
many corners—after the Iraq war, but has now returned, championed by many of the same 
countries that were the greatest opponents of invading Baghdad.”), with Sarah Joseph, 
Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, CASTAN CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. L. BLOG, (Mar. 18, 2011, 
3:54 PM), http://castancentre.wordpress.com/2011/03/18/humanitarian-intervention-in-libya 
(discussing the pros and cons of international intervention in Libya). 
 19. See, e.g., Jeb Sharp, Why Libya is Different from Darfur, PRI’S THE WORLD
(Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.theworld.org/2011/04/libya-intervention-darfur-sudan. See also
Rebecca Kaplan, Between Sudan and Libya, Critics See U.S. Inconsistency, NAT’L J. (Mar. 
18, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/between-sudan-and-libya-critics-see-
u-s-inconsistency-20110314. 
 20. See Simon Chesterman, ‘Leading from Behind’: The Responsibility to Protect, 
the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya (N.Y.U., Pub. L. & Legal 
Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-35, 2011) (describing the role of advocates 
for intervention in Libya within the Obama administration). 
21. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS 
AND ARMED ATTACKS 2 (2002) (“On its face, the UN Charter, ratified by virtually every 
nation, is quite clear-eyed about its intent: to initiate a new global era in which war is 
forbidden as an instrument of state policy, but collective security becomes the norm.”) 
(emphasis in original); ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 29 (1993) (stating most 
important task of U.N. Charter as “maintenance of international peace and security”).
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settle international disputes.22 The Charter set out a system of checks on the 
use of military power by particular states, in favor of a coordinated, 
international approach to the use of force where deemed necessary in order 
to restore peace and security.23 The determination of such a threat was to 
come from the Security Council, acting in its core capacity as keeper of that 
international peace and security.24
The notable exception to this restriction on the use of force was in the 
context of self-defense, at least against an immediate and demonstrable 
threat to the state’s integrity in the form of an armed attack.25 As is well 
known, the integrated system envisaged by the U.N. Charter—meant to 
include a kind of international enforcement brigade at the beck and call of 
the Security Council—was never even remotely implemented.26 The idea of 
an international military force—a kind of “international police”—to respond 
to threats to international peace and security was never realized, and has 
scarcely been treated as a matter high on the international agenda.27 At the 
same time, individual states have in reality continued to engage in armed 
conflict—based on their own determinations of national and international 
need—although legal scholars stick to their formalistic position that 
international law does not “allow” this except when that state has 
experienced armed attack, or when explicitly and unambiguously authorized 
 22. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state . . . .”). See also FRANCK, supra note 21, at 1-5 (characterizing 
Charter’s prohibition on unilateral recourse to force as “absolute”). 
 23. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42, 43 (authorizing use of force upon determination of 
Security Council that there exists a threat to international peace or security, or in response to 
act of aggression); FRANCK, supra note 21, at 2 (introducing international norm of collective 
security). 
 24. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (authorizing Security Council to make recommendations 
or decide measures to be taken to “restore international peace and security”). 
 25. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (authorizing use of individual force by individual U.N. 
members if an armed attack occurs against them); AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 31 
(detailing U.N. Charter exceptions to art. 2, para. 4). 
 26. See U.N. Charter arts. 42, 43 (obligating U.N. members to make available to 
Security Council armed forces and facilities for authorized military actions); AREND & BECK,
supra note 21, at 52-53 (distinguishing between pure collective security and ‘limited’ 
collective security arrangement implemented by United Nations); FRANCK, supra note 21, at 
2 (envisioning an international military police force). In short, the attempt of the United 
Nations to establish a meaningful arrangement for collective security has been seriously 
undermined by: (1) the Security Council veto power wielded by its permanent members and 
(2) the inability of the U.N. to establish formal mechanisms for collective military action, as 
contemplated under Article 43 of the Charter. AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 57-58. 
 27. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 50-51 (describing attempts to recruit an 
international police force). Article 43 military agreements for the contribution of member 
state forces to Security Council missions broke down with the onset of (and primarily due to) 
the Cold War. Id.
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by the Security Council.28 It is glaringly obvious that there is a basic gap in 
the U.N. system where a ready, willing, and able international military 
entity should exist. This fundamental defect tends irresistibly in the 
direction of a reconceived right of states to engage in military action outside 
the parameters envisaged in the terms of the Charter, in certain defined 
circumstances.29
The two choices for reform seem to be either that states be given explicit 
latitude to go ahead and use force in appropriate circumstances relating to 
humanitarian need, or that the Charter-based vision of a global police force 
should be revived.30 If neither of these options can be exercised due to 
political obstacles, then it should be admitted that the post World War II 
international law experiment has been to some extent a failure, even if one 
can point to positive elements within the system of international relations 
and diplomacy. 
In light of the Security Council’s historical and ongoing gridlock, it has 
been proposed by some commentators that international law should be 
interpreted to allow individual nations or groups of nations to take action to 
prevent mass violations of human rights of the type that shock the global 
conscience and threaten international peace, given the existence of 
particular circumstances.31 However, the notion that the international 
 28. C.f. AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 76-79, 94-102, 114-28 (analyzing use of 
military force by sovereign states under various contexts including anticipatory self-defense, 
protection of nationals and humanitarian intervention). See also SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST 
WAR OR JUST PEACE? 87, 108-11 (2001) (rejecting any possible expansion of Article 2.4 
beyond self-defense and Security Council authorization and agreeing with Franck that 
although the international community may in some circumstances condone derogations from 
the customary uses of force allowed under the U.N. Charter, this is insufficient to provide 
those derogations any legal force).  
 29. See Linda A. Malone, The Responsibility to Protect Haiti, 14 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
(Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.asil.org/insights100310.cfm (questioning traditional rules of 
state consent and Security Council authorization in face of environmental and humanitarian 
disasters, as well as widespread public health dilemmas); Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian 
Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703, 707 (2006) (identifying 
strain that intrastate conflict, civil war, terrorism and cases of massive internal violence have 
had on U.N. security structure). 
 30. C.f. NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 16 (2000) (recognizing a new norm of Security Council-
authorized intervention). Compare Henry Shue, Limiting Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 11, 21 (Jennifer Welsh ed., 2004) (theorizing 
that basic negative rights such as right not to be killed place a duty upon states to protect), 
with Chesterman, supra note 20, at 2 (framing NATO intervention in Kosovo as a violation 
of international law and a blow to sound international relations policy found in U.N. 
Charter). 
 31. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of 
Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for 
Humanitarian Purposes in International Society, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 29, 48-51 (disputing not the existence of 
intervention norm, but only its scope); see also ERIC HEINZE, WAGING HUMANITARIAN WAR
134-38 (2004) (describing a consequentialist, morally permissible strand of intervention); see
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community should openly embrace “humanitarian intervention” of this kind 
has also been strongly resisted, at least where the action has not received the 
explicit blessing of the Security Council.32 It is unsurprising that many have 
advocated for a doctrine of humanitarian intervention to act as a legally 
recognized exception to the (formal if ineffective) doctrine that states 
should renounce reliance on unilateral force in international relations,33
considering that state and non-state actors are precluded under international 
law from violating the basic human rights of civilians. Nonetheless, 
opposition to formalizing a doctrine of humanitarian intervention on behalf 
of ordinary people has remained surprisingly strong.34 In light of the fact 
that international custom evolves only slowly, and that an international 
treaty (or Charter revision) seeking to define situations triggering an armed 
international response remains highly unlikely, lack of resolution on this 
also Mehrdad Payandeh, Note, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept 
of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 YALE J.
INT’L L. 469 (2010). 
 32. AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 112-14; Sean Murphy, Protean Jus Ad Bellum,
27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 22, 24 (2009) (noting predominant view among states that 
humanitarian intervention is not a valid legal justification for use of force); see Jean 
D’Aspremont, Mapping the Concepts Behind the Contemporary Liberalization of the Use of 
Force in International Law, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1089, 1089 n.1 (2010) (noting that Art. 2(4) 
prohibition on use of force has been “eroded” by lack of reaction to violations); 
d’Aspremont, supra at 1109-10 (d’Aspremont is far from convinced, though, that there is any 
consensus around particular exceptions to the Charter’s prohibition. He also fails to fully 
address the fact that the collective security system envisaged by the Charter was never truly 
developed. As for the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” and the more contemporary 
responsibility to protect, he writes: “Although [the doctrine of humanitarian intervention] has 
been expressly invoked by some States and supported by some scholars, it seems uncontested 
that positive international law does not enshrine anything close to an entitlement to use force 
in the case of a humanitarian disaster on the territory of another State. Even the vague 
political concept of the responsibility to protect falls short of recognizing any entitlement to 
use force in the absence of a Security Council authorization.” Id.) (internal footnotes 
omitted). 
 33. See Fernando R. Tesón, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 323 (1996); Samuel Vincent Jones, Darfur, The Authority of Law, and Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 97, 116-19 (2007); Christopher P. DeNicola, 
A Shield for the “Knights of Humanity”: The ICC Should Adopt a Humanitarian Necessity 
Defense To the Crime of Aggression, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 641, 662-69 (2008) (contemplating 
illegality of unilateral humanitarian intervention as a crime of aggression under ICC Rome 
Statute). 
34. See Chesterman, supra note 28, at 235-36 (2001); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN 
& the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 n.9 (1999); Payandeh, supra note 
31, at 470, 482-83 (doubting any claim that responsibility to protect contains normative 
content and noting the recent failures of the international community to act even in the face 
of mass atrocities against civilians, Payandeh writes: “By the end of the twentieth century, 
the world was deeply divided into proponents who regarded humanitarian intervention as 
often the only effective means to address massive human rights violations and critics to 
whom humanitarian intervention was nothing but a rhetorical and euphemistic pretext under 
which the great powers pursued their imperialist self-interests through coercive measures.” 
Id. at 469). 
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vital issue will continue to undermine the international rule of law.35 A 
central argument of this article is that there is no genuine “international rule 
of law” without a clearly defined, militarily effective doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. 
Those most strenuously opposed to the adoption of a humanitarian 
exception have expressed doubt that a pro-intervention doctrine would be 
used impartially and fairly, and there is a fear that strong states would rely 
on the doctrine to interfere in an exploitative manner in the affairs of weaker 
states.36 Humanitarian intervention is also opposed by those who are 
resistant to the proliferation of virtually any genuinely binding international 
norms and collective actions predicated on those norms.37 In theory, the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention as an exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force awaits the development of “international consensus”—
something that is unlikely to occur in the near term.38 The upshot of this 
state of affairs is that the “international community” adheres—if 
ambivalently—to a doctrine which holds that, in the absence of Security 
Council approval, the unilateral (or group) use of force is unlawful except 
for purposes of self defense (either on one’s own behalf or at the specific 
request of another state under attack)—despite the fact that the unilateral 
 35. Neville F. Dastoor, The Responsibility to Refine: The Need for a Security Council 
Committee on the Responsibility to Protect, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 25, 27-29, 32-35 (2009) 
(noting slow pace of R2P implementation due to lack of any activation system and resistance 
from permanent Security Council members).  
 36. See Adam Roberts, The So-Called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention, 2000 
Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 32 (noting fear of former colonial states in Africa and Asia 
as to expansion of humanitarian intervention); see also Petr Valek, Note, Is Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention Compatible With the U.N. Charter?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1223, 
1250 (2005) (citing dicta from ICJ’s Corfu Channel case contemplating system of 
intervention dismissed by most powerful states). 
 37. Contrast Chesterman, supra note 20, at 5 (listing various theories of customary 
international law already proliferating with respect to humanitarian intervention and making 
the point that, with the proliferation of newly-formulated models of ‘lawful’ intervention, the 
formal requirements for the use of force embodied in the U.N. Charter have been gradually 
weakened); but see Jutta Brunnee & Stephen Troope, The Responsibility to Protect and the 
Use of Force: Building Legality?, 7 (Mar. 23, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551296 (unpublished manuscript) (A formal plenary debate 
ensued). 
 38. Payandeh, supra note 31, at 484-85 (recognizing difficulty in characterizing 
actions of international actors as stemming from obligation or responsibility to protect and 
predicts that because states are motivated by so many factors, it will be unlikely if not 
impossible for any responsibility to protect to collect a body of state practice and opinio juris 
necessary to cement the principle as jus cogens). See also d’Aspremont, supra note 32, at 
1102; AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 136 (noting states that have condoned or supported 
humanitarian intervention often characterize their actions in other terms, such as self-
defense); Brunnee & Troope, supra note 37 (outlining the international norm building 
process and showing that it is to the detriment of the Responsibility to Protect). 
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use of force in reality remains relatively commonplace.39 Adding to this 
confusing state of affairs, the rise of non-state actors as perpetrators of 
organized violence in the post-Cold War era makes the failure to embrace 
humanitarian intervention as a valid exception to the (theoretical) restraint 
on the use of force seem particularly anachronistic, even cruel.40
Given the range of conflicts in which the world has failed to act 
expeditiously to prevent what seems otherwise preventable slaughter (the 
Balkans, Rwanda, Darfur, civil wars in Sierra Leone and Uganda), it is 
natural that there should be intellectual developments aimed at leading us 
out of this international law impasse, this Westphalian stranglehold. In fact, 
where a jus cogens norm has been articulated and widely accepted, and 
where such a norm is being obviously violated, it is especially odd not to 
allow—even encourage—an armed response. Indeed, it would perhaps 
make more sense to say that an armed or otherwise real and effective 
response is required in such circumstances. 
II. REHABILITATING INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT
In the light of this contradictory state of affairs, the Canadian-inspired 
report of 2001, The Responsibility to Protect, authored by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,41 is a predictable and 
logical attempt to recast the traditional concept of humanitarian intervention 
as a responsibility, a duty, on states to protect the vulnerable.42 This new 
formulation (a duty on the part of states to protect civilians) sounds 
significantly better than an exception to a prohibition on interfering with 
another State’s territory. In articulating a “responsibility to protect,” there is 
no need to manufacture a reason to deviate from a foundational concept of 
 39. Valek, supra note 36, at 1228 (setting forth leading opinion on legality of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention as finding no support in current customary international 
law). 
 40. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 3-5 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS], available at
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (discussing effects of non-state actors on 
U.N. Charter framework); d’Aspremont, supra note 32, at 1119-21 (noting ill-fit of Charter 
article 2(4) to situations involving non-state actors). 
 41. ICISS, supra note 40.  
 42. See generally ICISS, supra note 40, at VI-X (setting forth core principles of 
R2P). See Payandeh, supra note 31, at 470, 482 (deciphering significance of term 
“responsibility to protect”). Payandeh writes that “[t]he concept [of the responsibility to 
protect] moves the debate past the controversial notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ to a 
‘responsibility to protect,’ thereby focusing on the perspective of the victims of human rights 
violations.” Id. at 470. See also Patrick J. Flood, A Next Rwanda? A Next Iraq? Military 
Intervention in the 21st Century, 11 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 383 (2005) (“The 
Commission rightly affirms the existence of a responsibility to protect human life even in the 
face of the important norm of nonintervention, and that appropriate action to carry out this 
responsibility should be recognized as legal.”). 
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the United Nations (that is, the prohibition on the unilateral use of force)—
even one that has been more honored in the breach than otherwise.43 Rather, 
the responsibility to protect sounds like an extension of other positively-
framed human rights principles, not a problematic expansion of the range of 
situations in which states may act militarily in the absence of clear 
authorization of the Security Council.44
It may be asked whether this shift in emphasis from humanitarian 
intervention to the duty to protect is more than a simple repackaging.45
Certainly the reframing has an intellectually calming effect, as it extends the 
already familiar reach of positive state obligations in the realm of human 
rights law; it lengthens the human rights terrain, as it were.46 On the other 
hand, as with other human rights principles and mores, it leaves unresolved 
the important question of when the duty arises, whose duty it is to try and 
stop atrocities from happening, and what the penalties should be (and by 
what entity imposed) for failure to live up to this duty to protect.47 The 
difference may be either semantic or more substantive, but the term 
“humanitarian intervention” does have the virtue of linking the demands of 
 43. See ICISS, supra note 40, at 15-18 (shifting terms of intervention debate away 
from territorial integrity towards protection of human needs). 
 44. It is important to note that the R2P framework calls for the duty to engage and 
take whatever non-military force that may be necessary first. The first two pillars of R2P 
involve the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to react—the latter of which may 
involve a wide range of measures that fall short of military intervention. See ICISS, supra
note 40, at 19-31. 
 45. ICISS, supra note 40, at 12 (“Changing the language . . . does not, of course, 
change the substantive issues which have to be addressed.”). Various scholars throughout the 
recent past have posed this question. See Payandeh, supra note 31, at 481 (discounting 
responsibility to protect as little more than a change in terminology); Natalie Oman, The 
Responsibility to Prevent: A Remit for Intervention, 22 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 355, 361 (2009) 
(characterizing R2P as a reinterpretation of U.N. Charter art. 39 authorizing force in light of 
threats to international peace and security); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: 
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 102, 111-15 (2007) 
(noting presence of certain parts of R2P framework in various international law documents 
dating back to time of Hugo Grotius).  
 46. See ICISS, supra note 40, at 15 (attempting to bridge the gap between national 
security and individual human rights). See also Oman, supra note 45, at 357 (arguing that the 
responsibility to protect “provides proponents of intervention on humanitarian grounds with 
a theoretical foundation for focusing upon the needs of individuals”). For a good background 
on the liberal theory of duty toward civilians suffering gross human rights violations and 
viewing only those nations which protect the fundamental human rights of their citizens as 
belonging to community of nations, see generally Tesón, supra note 33, at 3-11.  
 47. Jeremy I. Levitt, The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver Without a Dam, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L. L. 153, 170-72 (2003) (reviewing Int’l Comm’n on Intervention & State 
Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect (2001)) (questioning definitive nature of “just cause” 
requirement and admonishing R2P for its reliance on Security Council authorization); Stahn, 
supra note 45, at 117-18 (pointing out failure of R2P to address consequences for states that 
do not take action to respond, react, prevent and doubting that the authors of R2P 
contemplated the remedy of direct action against non-complying states). 
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humanity with an active, direct, and even militaristic effectiveness.48 By 
explicitly connecting humanitarian intervention with the Charter’s 
proscription on the unilateral use of force—connecting it, that is, as an 
exception—there may be less danger that the concept will languish in the 
realm of human rights do-goodism and be lost sight of.49 The term 
“humanitarian intervention” implies a robust right to act militarily being 
granted to ready and willing member states of the United Nations, allowing 
them to deviate from the general restriction on the use of force to protect a 
threatened group of persons.50 Perhaps the best of both worlds could be 
found in an international duty to engage in humanitarian intervention,51
although this formulation would almost certainly invite states to argue their 
incapacity for doing so. The opposite side of this coin would be the over-
eagerness of certain states to take the lead in such actions. 
International law has supposedly developed a “short list” of particularly 
heinous criminal acts. Based on the combined conceptual traditions of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law, jus cogens
norms constitute a set of thou shalt not behaviors about which there is no 
further international argument possible.52 Torture, rape, genocide, use and 
abuse of children by either state armies or other organized militias—these 
actions are unequivocally proscribed at the international level. No state, or 
indeed non-state actor, may lawfully engage in these behaviors, and no one 
can validly defend such actions. With that in mind, it is extraordinary that 
the international community has not placed greater emphasis on developing 
 48. See ICISS, supra note 40, at 9 (seeking to avoid militarizing the humanitarian 
term); Levitt, supra note 47, at 155 (noting the disdain many humanitarians hold for the 
phrase “humanitarian intervention” due to its invocation as an exception for use of 
militaristic force); Payandeh, supra note 31, at 470-71 (“Conceptually [The Responsibility to 
Protect] tries to cut the Gordian knot of tension between sovereignty and human rights by 
embedding the notion of human rights in the idea of state sovereignty.”). 
 49. See GEORGE R. LUCAS, JR., PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITARIAN MILITARY 
INTERVENTION 39 (2001) (linking need for a strong U.S. military force to reality of failed 
states around world and need for humanitarian intervention). The “Albright Doctrine,” 
named after former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright and exemplified by U.S.-
led NATO strikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo, envisions the humanitarian uses of force 
as the chief reason for raising, training, equipping and deploying a world-class military. Id. at 
36. 
 50. See infra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text (discussing morally permissible 
behavior and humanitarian intervention as affirmative defenses to proscription on force); but 
see ICISS, supra note 40, at 16- 17 (stating that framing issue as a right to intervene may de-
legitimatize humanitarian purposes). 
 51. Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 355 
(2010) (proposing a framework for assessing whether a bystander state has a duty to 
intervene). 
 52. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical 
Norms, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (Donald Earl Childress III ed., 
2012) (describing the lack of consensus concerning the scope of the jus cogens definition, 
and asserting the essentially moral roots of jus cogens norms). 
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a doctrine of jus cogens-level crimes of omission, along the lines of
irrefutably unlawful failures to act.
Identifying such failures appears far more significant than prosecuting 
violators of jus cogens norms after the fact, in that failure to protect leads 
directly to suffering that could otherwise be prevented. While in the absence 
of an international military force such as the Charter originally envisaged it 
would be difficult to pin this responsibility on any particular state or states, 
at a minimum acceptance of the doctrine could put humanitarian 
intervention on a clear legal footing. The international community itself 
would then be obligated to come up with a set of options with respect to 
which countries and which military forces are in the best position to take 
action. A new emphasis on prevention could make legal skepticism towards 
justified intervention obsolete.  
For that matter, the legally binding duty could be framed as a duty to 
prevent; a protective notion evident in the full title of the “Genocide 
Convention,” for instance—which is framed as a convention “on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”53 While it may be 
superficially assumed that the duty to prevent applies to national leaders vis 
 53. See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 91, ¶ 165 (Feb. 26) 
[hereinafter Bosnian Muslim Genocide Case] (“In particular, the Contracting Parties have a 
direct obligation to prevent genocide.”). This idea, as explained above, can easily and 
logically be extended beyond the obligation to prevent actors within one’s own territorial 
state from engaging in this behavior. Indeed, in the same ruling, the ICJ states that “[t]he 
substantive obligations arising from Articles I and III are not on their face limited by 
territory. They apply to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways 
appropriate to meeting the obligations in question.” Id. ¶ 183. See also id. ¶ 430, wherein the 
Court states that “responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all 
measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have 
contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of ‘due diligence,’ which calls 
for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance.” (emphasis in original). It should be 
noted, though, that some of the absurdity of international law is on display throughout the 
judgment, where the ICJ finds that in most instances of mass slaughter the requisite “dolus 
specialis” for genocide is not present! See, e.g., id. ¶ 376 in which the Court states that it has  
already concluded . . . that—save in the case of Srebrenica—the 
Applicant has not established that any of the widespread and serious 
atrocities, complained of as violating Article II, paragraphs (a) to (e) 
of the Genocide Convention, were accompanied by the necessary 
specific intent (dolus specialis) on the part of the perpetrators. It also 
finds that the Applicant has not established the existence of that 
intent on the part of the Respondent, either on the basis of a 
concerted plan, or on the basis that the events reviewed above reveal 
a consistent pattern of conduct which could only point to the 
existence of such intent.  
See also, ¶ 415 where the Court presents similarly convoluted reasoning to the effect that 
“the acts of those who committed genocide at Srebrenica cannot be attributed to the 
Respondent under the rules of international law of State Responsibility; thus, the 
international responsibility of the Respondent is not engaged on this basis.” 
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á vis activities within their own territories, it seems logical that the duty 
should be extended to potentially all states in their capacity as observers, 
even arm’s length ones. There is no good reason why fears of territorial 
encroachment should make this extension controversial, at least not if the 
international community begins to take as its focus the actual suffering 
international law was meant to alleviate—as opposed to professional legal 
concerns that purport to have “preventative” effects, but in reality do not 
appear to.54
A. International Protection: It Cannot be Pacifist or Piecemeal  
As the international military force envisaged in the U.N. Charter—to be 
at the ready for use by the Security Council—never came into being, there 
is a conspicuous gap where an international “police force” should logically 
be.55 There is no international military to respond to the phenomenon of 
mass killings by a state or by non-state actors, and in situations of political 
collapse this often leaves the most vulnerable populations at the mercy of 
extremely violent forces.56 In at least some of these situations, even a 
modest international force, insulated from the restraining influences of 
national politics, could take action to stop rape, torture, and killing from the 
outset.57 This would be especially effective in situations of low-tech 
warfare, where small militias target villagers and other weak and 
defenseless groups, and where the national military is unable or unwilling to 
adequately protect. Such a force could come quickly and efficiently to the 
assistance of governments or governmental factions struggling to contain 
internal strife leading to ethnic slaughter. This is not to suggest that any use 
of force can be entirely problem free, but compared with the spectacle of 
 54. See id. ¶ 427 (pointing out that “it is not the case that the obligation to prevent 
has no separate legal existence of its own; that it is, as it were, absorbed by the obligation to 
punish . . . . The obligation on each contracting State to prevent genocide is both normative 
and compelling.”). Of course, the ICJ in this case was talking about a situation in which a 
State has some degree of influence over the perpetrators of an imminent genocide—not the 
case of intervention by a third party for the sake of protecting those in need of protection. 
Nevertheless, it is the logic of international law that is in question here; the burgeoning 
norms of international law are worse than meaningless if the international community 
assumes no burden of physical implementation. See also id. ¶ 429 (pointing out that the 
principle of prevention appears in a number of important conventions.). 
 55. See infra notes 58, 60, 65, 67 and accompanying text (tracing the history of U.N. 
Charter and the fate of the proposed international police force attached to the U.N. 
organization). 
 56. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE 381-85 (2002) (estimating the forces necessary to have stopped Rwandan 
genocide).  
 57. See generally id. (estimating forces necessary to contain threat of genocide in 
Rwanda and elsewhere). 
2012] Yes, No, Maybe 195
senseless, long-running regional conflicts, a military-based conclusion is 
certainly to be preferred.58
As mentioned above, there remains resistance to the suggestion that the 
international legal community has begun to embrace an exception to the rule 
against armed interference in the affairs of another state, even where the 
need for such intervention is obvious.59 The United States underwent a 
period of extreme remorse over its intervention in Somalia in an attempt to 
avert humanitarian catastrophe; the political establishment within the United 
States and abroad was highly critical of President Clinton for his decision to 
send in American troops for the “mere” purpose of providing aid to a 
starving population.60 Other uses of force by the United States in what has 
seemed more obvious self-interest have garnered less domestic criticism.61
It is understandable that the international community might still prefer a 
clear-cut rejection of “humanitarian intervention” over adoption of a 
principle that could, in theory, provide justification for a wide range of 
military actions by one nation against another.62 There is no indication that 
we have drawn nearer to creating any truly international police force for 
these purposes. U.N. peacekeepers are sent in to maintain an already 
established peace and not to use force proactively to protect vulnerable 
populations from violence while the relevant conflict is still “hot.”63 Thus, 
 58. TAYLOR B. SEYBOLT, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE CONDITIONS 
FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE 1-22 (2008). 
 59. See infra notes 65, 67 (documenting resistance of international law scholars to 
any duty to protect or right to intervene). 
 60. PETER RONAYNE, NEVER AGAIN? THE UNITED STATES AND THE PREVENTION AND 
PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE SINCE THE HOLOCAUST 3, 163-64 (2001) (noting effect of news 
media and public opinion on policymakers following debacle in Somalia). See also Walter 
Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, FOREIGN 
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1996, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51844/walter-
clarke-and-jeffrey-herbst/somalia-and-the-future-of-humanitarian-intervention (describing 
public reaction in the United States to Clinton’s use of force in Somalia for humanitarian 
purposes). 
 61. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, PUBLIC WARY OF 
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA (2011), available at 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1927/strong-opposition-us-involvement-libya-military-
overcommitted. 
 62. See Sophie Clavier, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 145, 151 (2009) (reviewing
a chapter by Willy Mamah entitled Is Humanitarian Intervention a Pseudonym for 
Aggressive unilateralism? (adopting “the view point that unilateral humanitarian intervention 
is . . . used as a Trojan horse by interventionist countries”)), in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES ON 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR 
CHRISTIAN NWACHUKWU OKEKE 643( Chima Centus Nweze ed., 2009); see also Marjorie 
Cohn, The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, in LESSONS OF KOSOVO: THE 
DANGERS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 121 (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003).
 63. U.N. DEP’TS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 25-26 (2008) available at
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf (describing that today, U.N. 
peacekeeping operations are typically deployed as part of a much broader international effort 
to assist countries emerging from conflict; their primary mandates are to typically strengthen 
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the implementation of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention might well 
come to rely on action taken by military superpowers with uncertain 
consequences and with obvious implications for political objectivity.64
To ensure some consistency, it might be more desirable for international 
responses to be unabashedly driven by moralistic principles than by the 
usual “legal” ones.65 The development of international law according to its 
ordinary methodology is too time-consuming and too open-ended. The duty 
to prevent and protect, at least where feasible, could be placed on the same 
plane as other (non-derogable and/or morally self-evident) jus cogens norms 
whenever an imminent threat to civilians reached a certain level of 
seriousness. In a system without alternative protective mechanisms, there is 
little reason to hesitate when it comes to the need for armed assistance to 
protect the most vulnerable and urgently at risk.66
B. Why the Ready Assumption of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya? 
It is noteworthy that when the Libyan government turned the full force of 
its military on opposition demonstrators in March 2011, the international 
response was swift and urgent.67 There was little evidence of agonized 
discussion of the rightness of humanitarian intervention—strong statements 
were made in the United States and in European capitals about the self-
evident necessity of taking action to protect both civilians and 
a State’s ability to provide security and to promote dialogue and reconciliation among 
civilian populations. To this end, U.N. peacekeepers often play a “catalytic role” in the 
following activities: disarmament, mine removal, security sector reform, human rights 
protection & education, and electoral assistance). Id. at 26. 
 64. See generally Suyash Paliwal, The Primacy of Regional Organizations in 
International Peacekeeping: The African Example, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 185 (2010) (discussing 
the use of regional forces).
 65. See SIOBHAN WILLS, PROTECTING CIVILIANS: THE OBLIGATIONS OF PEACEKEEPERS 
(2009) (arguing that the moral and political imperative to protect civilians ought to be a legal 
duty if the principles of the Geneva Conventions and general spirit of international law are to 
mean anything). See also Tesón, supra note 33, at 361 (arguing in favor of some type of 
moral analysis when considering standards of “international law”). 
 66. It is extraordinary that, even for authors who freely acknowledge the terrible 
failures of the international community to respond to mass violations of human rights, they 
also recognize that the system of making international law places an almost insurmountable 
obstacle in the way of the revised responsibility to protect doctrine. See, e.g., Payandeh, 
supra note 31, at 471-72 (arguing that this doctrine “lacks specific normative content” and 
that the corresponding “conceptual change in the understanding of sovereignty cannot, by 
itself, lead to a change in international law”). 
 67. See Christian Pippan, The 2011 Libyan Uprising, Foreign Military Intervention, 
and International Law, 2 JURIDIKUM: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KRITIK–RECHT–GESELLSCHAFT 159, 
159, 161-64 (2011) (describing the rapid-fire events that led to UN security Council-
authorized action against the Libyan government for the stated purpose of protecting 
civilians as part of a trend towards “value driven interventionism”). 
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demonstration leaders who had quickly come to be treated as a kind of 
government-in-waiting.68
The Security Council resolution allowing for this use of force retained 
the sort of ambiguity characteristic of the international approach to 
humanitarian intervention; the speed and strength of the resulting military 
response was highly unusual.69 As was true of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, 
the Libyan regime had been a thorn in the side of Western governments for 
decades. As so many humanitarian disasters had been ignored by the 
international community, it is not unreasonable to point out that strategic 
interests must have played a key role in pushing Western governments to 
take rapid and effective action against Libya. However, this brings us back 
to a central difficulty posed by the humanitarian intervention dilemma: If a 
coordinated military response to threats to international peace and security 
should be seen as a central aspect of the international rule of law, how can it 
be that these responses are so varying, so ad hoc, and so inconsistent? If 
anything, the more vulnerable the threatened group—especially where many 
children are involved—and where the low tech nature of the warfare (such 
as has been the case in many of the African civil wars) makes success 
almost assured, the more eager and enthusiastic the international response 
should be. Because an international response is often not forthcoming in 
even the most obvious type of situation, it may not be a stretch to conclude 
that international law is in fact too haphazard to be accurately termed “law.” 
Despite the existence of high level international prosecutions and elaborate 
treaty drafting mechanisms, it may be productive to acknowledge this 
 68. See Chesterman, supra note 20 (making the case that the international reaction to 
repression in Libya shows that it is harder in the contemporary world to do nothing in the 
face of such situations). Also note that there is less than full consensus on the meaning of the 
Security Council resolution on Libya and the implications of the international reaction going 
forward; see Russia Warns Over NATO Intervention in Libya, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO 
LIBERTY (June 5, 2011), available at
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_warns_over_nato_intervention_in_libya/24215871.html 
(“Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov has warned that NATO’s Libya campaign is 
‘one step’ away from sending in ground troops to assist antigovernment forces battling 
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.”); see id. (noting that while Russia abstained from the 
Security Council vote, its government stated that it had been supportive of some of the 
international moves to protect civilians, but was opposed to any escalation of that effort to 
include stronger military intervention). 
 69. The international action has also been roundly criticized from a variety of points 
of view. See, e.g., Chris Brown, Liberal Interventionism and the Case of Libya, INT’L AFF. AT 
LSE BLOG (Apr. 7, 2011), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2011/04/liberal-interventionism-and-
the-case-of-libya (explaining that recent action in Libya shows that ‘liberal interventionism’ 
to support the human rights of civilians is not exempt from politics and that “R2P and other 
consensus-oriented interventionist notions come up against this kind of contradiction because 
they are attempts to find non-political solutions to problems that are, in their very essence, 
political. ‘Protecting civilians’ sound like non-political idea we can all subscribe to, but when 
civilians are being attacked (as they certainly were in Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya) they 
are being attacked for a political reason, and, if you protect them, you are, whether you like it 
or not, intervening in local politics.”).  
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central failure of the postwar international legal system and work towards 
the development of a coherent and consistent template for civilian 
protection, a synthetic blend of humanitarian intervention, and the 
responsibility to protect. 
III. THE OLD “IS INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY LAW?” DEBATE
In light of these systemic failures, it is at times troubling to teach a 
course the law school catalog entitles International Law when so much of 
its subject matter fails to resemble law at all.70 Ideally, international law 
should reflect and encompass a set of aspirations around which the 
international community, acting through the United Nations and other 
bodies, mobilizes to generate clear norms and to ensure enforcement. 
Applying such norms across a wide variety of cultural zones—which 
international law inevitably must—is challenging in and of itself, but not 
insurmountable. It now amounts to a truism to say that the rightful subject 
matter of international law includes both relations between and among 
states as well as between state (and increasingly non-state) actors and 
civilians.71 Given the meteoric rise of human rights norms in the post-World 
War II period, international law should at a minimum provide assurance that 
 70. It is quite usual for a course in public international law to begin with the 
overarching question: Is International Law really law like other kinds of law? I begin my 
class with a selection from the now classic book LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (2d 
ed. 1970), wherein he explores the various criticism routinely made of international law. 
Henkin ultimately defends international law by arguing that international lawyers will insist 
that  
critics of international law ask and answer the wrong questions. 
What matters is not whether the international system has legislative, 
judicial, or executive branches corresponding to those we have 
become accustomed to seek in a domestic society; what matters is 
whether international law is reflected in the policies of nations and in 
relations between nations.  
Id. at 26. See, e.g., ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-73 (2003); Anthony D’Amato, Is
International Law Really “Law”?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (1985) (“Many serious 
students of the law react with a sort of indulgence when they encounter the term 
‘international law,’ as if to say, ‘well, we know it isn’t really law, but we know that 
international lawyers and scholars have a vested professional interest in calling it law.’”) 
(emphasis in original); Elizabeth M. Bruch, Is International Law Really Law? Theorizing 
The Multi-Dimensionality of Law, 44 AKRON L. REV. 333 (2011). 
 71. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE 
L.J. 2599, 2631 (1997) (describing global decision-making as being made by a “complex 
rugby scrum of nation-states, intergovernmental organizations, regional compacts, 
nongovernmental organizations, and informal regimes and networks”); David J. Bederman, 
Law of the Land, Law of the Sea: The Lost Link Between Customary International Law and 
the General Maritime Law, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 299 (2011); ICISS, supra note 40, at 3-4 
(highlighting various non-governmental organizations and other new institutional actors on 
the international stage, including factional terrorist sects). 
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certain types of gross victimization will become far less frequent.72
Proscriptions against genocide, torture, and other forms of inhumane 
treatment are now broadly accepted as part of our international legal 
inheritance.73
As mentioned above, there remain many instances in which the victims 
of organized atrocities (perpetrated either by state actors or insurgent 
militias) are extremely vulnerable, the violence used against them is quite 
low tech and not particularly complicated to prevent or to end, and yet the 
international community stands back as this violence unfolds.74 In such 
 72. See generally, Dinah Shelton, International Human Rights Law: Principled, 
Double, or Absent Standards?, 25 LAW & INEQ. 467 (2007), for a discussion of the main 
purposes behind and weaknesses in international human rights law. 
 73. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
 74. The literature on this problem is voluminous and draws a set of unmistakable 
conclusions, mainly to the effect that much of the extreme mass violence against civilians 
taking place in recent years could have been prevented by a committed international 
community. See generally POWER, supra note 56, at 132-36 (recounting rejection of proposal 
by Senator George McGovern to intervene militarily in Cambodia to halt genocidal Khmer 
Rouge by Carter Administration.); id. at 142 (“Twelve divisions of Vietnamese infantry 
easily disposed of the Khmer Rouge regime, responsible for the death of approximately 1.7 
million Cambodians, in a matter of two weeks during the winter of 1979.”); id. at 283-84 
(contesting figures supplied by U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as to forces necessary to neutralize 
nationalist Serb forces in former Yugoslavia); id. at 367-68 (describing vast undersupply of 
manpower provided to Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire, head of United Nations 
peacekeeping forces in Rwanda, during summer of 1994) (“Dallaire insists that the well-
equipped 1,000 man European force sent into Rwanda to evacuate nationals, together with 
300 U.S. Marines stationed in nearby Burundi, would have sufficed to stop the genocidal 
advances of Hutu fighters, who were armed primarily with machetes and clubs.”); id. at 357 
(“Former Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman believes that, playing on the 
Clinton Administration’s fear of mission creep, U.S. military officials inflated these figures 
in order to avoid military intervention in Bosnia.”); RONAYNE, supra note 60, at 3 (noting 
preference of West to create postgenocide tribunals as opposed to a committed prevention 
policy); id. at 178 (noting presence of American, French and Indian forces in nearby African 
localities) (“More recently, atrocities committed in Sudan, Uganda, the Democratic Peoples’ 
Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic have raised criticism as to the 
effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions around the globe.”); ELIZABETH NEUFFER, THE 
KEY TO MY NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND RWANDA 49, 82 (1st ed. 
2002) (noting emboldening effect of unfulfilled NATO airstrike threats on decisions by Serb 
leaders to bomb Bosnian Muslim areas and enter U.N. safe area at Srebenica); L.R.
MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA’S GENOCIDE (2000) 
(describing negligence and complicity of western powers and United Nations in Rwandan 
genocide); W. Michael Reisman, Prevention: Acting Before Victims Become Victims: 
Preventing and Arresting Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 57, 60-68 (2008) 
(relating abject failure of United States and international community to prevent genocide in 
Germany, Cambodia and Uganda). See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KILLINGS IN KIWANJA: THE 
UN’S INABILITY TO PROTECT CIVILIANS, 8-16, 22-25 ( 2008), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc1208web.pdf; CAR/DR Congo: LRA 
Conducts Massive Abduction Campaign, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 11, 2010), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/08/11/cardr-congo-lra-conducts-massive-abduction-
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cases, the term international law seems somewhat of an embarrassment.75 It 
can be painful to cover academic material that shows children in particular 
being mistreated in the most egregious fashion by militarily 
unsophisticated—and thus hardly invincible—groups during armed 
conflicts that often continue for years.76 In such instances, it would seem 
that both the rules and the ideals of the international community—reflecting 
what could be thought of as international constitutional law—should 
mandate an organized and effective response by that international 
community.77 This is generally not the case, however, as international law 
consistently fails to offer anything of immediate value to those most acutely 
in need of protection.78 This is more than a complaint directed at the 
campaign (reporting the abduction of approximately 700 adults and children for war and sex 
throughout Central African Republic and the northern DR Congo by Lord’s Resistance 
Army, and that only 1,000 out of the 19,000 U.N. peacekeeping troops assigned to the region 
were stationed within reach of the affected areas); Scott Baldauf, Mass Rape in Congo 
Reignites Questions on Efficacy of UN Force, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Aug. 25, 2010) , 
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0825/Mass-rape-in-Congo-
reignites-questions-on-efficacy-of-UN-force (documenting mass rapes in eastern Congo of 
more than 150 women and children with U.N. peacekeepers stationed less than 20 miles 
away). 
 75. See Part II, supra.
 76. See U.N. Secretary General, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Rep. of the 
expert of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 24–27, U.N. Doc A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996) (by Graca 
Machel) [hereinafter Machel Report] (establishing link between rise in civilian warfare, 
displaced populations, and the use of child soldiers utilizing cheap, light weaponry); Timothy 
Webster, Babes With Arms: International Law and Child Soldiers, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 227 (2007) (recognizing that child soldiers are most likely to be engaged in prolonged, 
low-intensity conflicts characterized by fragmentation of armies and police forces and high 
civilian casualty losses). In 2007, author approximated that 300,000 child soldiers were 
actively engaged in combat. The figure of 300,000 children engaged in active combat is cited 
in numerous sources. See, e.g., id. at 231; AFUA TWUM-DANSO, AFRICA’S YOUNG SOLDIERS:
THE CO-OPTION OF CHILDHOOD, 9, (2003); COAL. TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS,
CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2008, at 7, 9 (2008) [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS REPORT] 
(reporting that children were actively involved in armed conflict in government forces or 
non-state armed groups in 19 countries or territories between April 2004 and October 2007). 
 77. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 13-15 (1990) (noting transformation of 
idea of constitutional rights into a universal conception); U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55; United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 
24) (citing principles contained in U.N. Charter and those “fundamental” principles 
enumerated in Universal Declaration of Human Rights); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: CUSTOMARY INT’L LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 
cmt. a (1987) (listing genocide, murder, torture, and causing disappearance of individuals as 
“those human rights whose status as customary law is generally accepted”); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (listing those crimes outlawed as violating law of 
nations). 
 78. See MELVERN, supra note 74; POWER, supra note 56, at 369 (recounting Security 
Council vote to slash peacekeeping forces of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
amid slaughter in April 1994); Philipp Kastner, The ICC in Darfur—Savior or Spoiler?, 14 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 145, 147 (2007) (claiming the tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
were “too late to influence the conflict whilst the atrocities were being committed”); id. at 
146 (claiming that on the whole, the international community is “slow to react”). 
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systemic defects of international law enforcement, a type of analysis which 
has been presented repeatedly in recent decades.79 Rather, there is a strong 
argument to be made that abstract, academic claims regarding the reality 
and the effectiveness of international law should, as a matter of conscience, 
be scaled back.80 A more honest appraisal of the current capacities of 
international law could lead international policy makers to reconsider and 
redraft the pillars on which contemporary international law stands.81
The gap between international law rhetoric and reality has of course not 
gone unnoticed. A considerable number of writings, intended to 
demonstrate the gross disparity between the promises made by international 
law and its weak delivery of protection for civilians on the ground, feature 
stark, symbolically charged descriptions of particular atrocities.82 Across 
time and space—Cambodia, Iraq, the Balkans, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda, Darfur, Congo and Kyrgyzstan—there is no dearth of examples 
tailor-made for demonstrating the ineffectiveness of international law and 
the fecklessness of the international community when it comes to 
preventing fear, suffering, and slaughter.83 There are many advocates for a 
clear articulation of the view that the familiar failure of the international 
 79. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 179 (explaining that states have begun to 
re-think “peace before justice” paradigm characterized by weak U.N. enforcement system); 
PATTISON, supra note 3, at 15 (portraying reality gap between international instruments 
aimed at protecting civilians in warfare and atrocities committed on ground); Jones, supra
note 33, at 108 (characterizing U.N. Charter as a woefully ineffective means of protecting 
human rights). 
80. Developments in the Law—International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 
1966 (2001) (stating that international law fails to meet its ambitions often enough to be 
considered illusory). See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 184 (offering support for 
“rejectionist” interpretation of U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 proposed by Professor Thomas 
Franck.); AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 185 (explaining the rejectionist approach argues 
that, due to the large disparity between what states “have been saying and…doing,” Article 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter—supposedly the pillar of our modern international legal order—has 
been rendered a legal fiction).  
 81. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 188-94 (predicting emergence of a new 
international value hierarchy with new legal obligations and expanded bases for jus ad 
bellum). 
 82. See, e.g., POWER, supra note 56, at XI—XIII (depicting the scene of young 
children killed in bombing of Sarajevo); MELVERN, supra note 74, at 157-62 (describing 
scenes of corpses floating down Rwandan rivers, organized massacres held in churches and 
construction of mass grave sites); id. at 158 (describing that, in Rwanda, the entire 
population of Tutsi men were often exterminated in each village, with mothers and widows 
forced to dig their graves). Melvern tells the story of one survivor: “I will never forget the 
sight of my son pleading with me not to bury him alive . . . he kept trying to come out and 
was beaten back. And we had to keep covering the pit with earth until . . . there was no 
movement left.” Id.; Jones, supra note 33, at 97-98 (describing carnage of Sudan’s Darfuri 
landscape following attack by Janjaweed Arab militia forces).  
 83. See POWER, supra note 56, and accompanying text (noting failure of international 
community to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Congo, Darfur, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda). 
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community to respond in the face of mass atrocities is unacceptable.84 Such 
a theory would, by extension, demand that states take action to protect the 
vulnerable when they are under extreme threat—the so-called duty or 
responsibility to “protect,” discussed above.85 It has been forcefully argued 
that time and again the international community has stepped out of the way 
to allow torturers to get on with their business; time and again 
commentators have bemoaned the lack of action taken by anyone to prevent 
even the most unorganized, low tech, and internationally unimpressive 
tyrants from acting with total impunity against the defenseless.86 The 
geographical range across which this phenomenon has played out is 
striking; the fact that the international political reaction follows a more or 
less identical pattern raises intense concern; yet, the pattern persists.87
Despite a great deal of rhetoric to the contrary, international law remains 
overwhelmingly a system designed to protect the interests of sovereign 
states by ensuring stability of territorial boundaries and deterring outside 
“interference” within those boundaries.88 It continues to promise more than 
 84. See, e.g., PATTISON, supra note 3, at VIII (outlining the core framework of the 
responsibility to protect); Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and 
Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT 
& SECURITY L. 191 (2008); Peter Stockburger, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: 
Customary International Law, An Emerging Legal Norm, or Just Wishful Thinking?, 5
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 365 (2010); Rebecca J. Hamilton, Recent Developments, 
The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine—But What of Implementation?, 
19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289 (2006); Emma McClean, The Responsibility to Protect: The Role 
of International Human Rights Law, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 123 (2008); Payandeh, 
supra note 31, at 469. 
 85. ICISS, supra note 40, at VII (setting forth criteria necessary prior to military 
intervention in humanitarian crises); Samantha Power, The Void: Why the Movement Needs 
Help, NEW REPUBLIC, May 15, 2006, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-
events/news/commentary/the-void-why-the-movement-needs-help (describing objectives and 
accomplishments of American movement to end genocide in Sudan). 
 86. MELVERN, supra note 74, at 227-33 (capturing lack of political will among 
Western and African leaders); POWER, supra note 56, at XIV-XVII (noting consistency of 
U.S. responses to cases of genocide throughout 20th century).  
 87. POWER, supra note 56, at XIV-XVII; MELVERN, supra note 74, at 5 (explaining 
organized nature of genocide). 
 88. STEVEN L. BURG & PAUL S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ETHNIC 
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 10 (1999) (commenting on domination of 
realist principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity over international human rights 
enforcement); A Problem from Hell: A Conversation with Samantha Power, Part 1, GOOGLE 
VIDEOS (Mar. 2, 2007), http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2209257471900990711 
(noting inconsistent application of sovereignty as both a sword for and a shield against calls 
for unilateral humanitarian intervention); Payandeh, supra note 31, at 487 (describing tension 
between sovereignty and human rights regime); AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 40, 58, 
114, 136 (justice over peace, rejection of limited collective security). ); Tesón, supra note 33, 
at 371 (“The rise of collective humanitarian intervention and the shrinking of traditional 
concept[s] of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are essential for the preservation of peace 
. . . . Conversely, if we lose the battle for democracy and human rights, we necessarily lose 
the battle for peace and security. . . . [T]he gradual dilution of state sovereignty is . . . a moral 
imperative.”).  
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it can deliver to the world’s people and often operates primarily in the realm 
of assertion.89 At the highest levels of international institution building, this 
image of international law as unresponsive in the face of mass atrocities has 
undergone some repair work in the form of a large number of “post-conflict 
criminal tribunals.”90 However, as these tribunals generally proceed with 
prosecutions after the atrocities have occurred, and as there is generally 
little, if any, prior accompanying intervention in the ongoing slaughter, it is 
possible to see these forums as largely symbolic constructs, providing 
international lawyers with the sense that they are doing something 
meaningful to deter mass violence against civilians.91 More darkly, they can 
be seen as designed to give international lawyers a professional role in 
world affairs.92 This nexus of after-the-fact activity we might call the
pseudo-effective face of contemporary international law. Because they do 
not touch upon the precipitating events directly, these tribunals provide no 
substitute for action that might have been taken to stop the many waves of 
violence directed at civilians.  
 89. See, e.g., Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 81, 115 (1991) (“[I]nternational law is merely a particular type of discourse 
about international social life. It is a method of conversation that states have chosen to 
follow. To some it is a conversation entirely without content.”). See also JACK L. GOLDSMITH 
& ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2005). 
 90. See generally Ellis, supra note 16 (reviewing several major conflict zones during 
the past 25 years); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S FIRST YEARS (2008) [hereinafter COURTING HISTORY],
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62135/section/1 (examining accomplishments and 
shortcomings of ICC since its opening in 2003). 
 91. The performance of the ICTY is but one example. In 2011, out of the 126 
concluded cases, only 64 were convicted, the rest either being acquitted, dead, transferred to 
a regional jurisdiction or had their indictments withdrawn. See Avery Capstone as to most 
prominent complaints with regards to ICTY, including unclear mandate and poor victim-
witness services. See also ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF 
JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE (2005). See NEUFFER, supra note 74, at 129-31, 256-57, 428, 437, 
443. See generally Hans Peter-Kaul, Construction Site for More Justice: The International 
Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370 (2005) (describing functions of 
Office of the Prosecutor at ICC, activities conducted in first years of existence); id. at 380 
(The United Nations Security Council took three years to refer the ongoing genocide in 
Sudan to the International Criminal Court); COURTING HISTORY, supra note 90 (In its first 
five years of existence, the International Criminal Court issued 12 public arrest warrants, id.
at 4; only four of the alleged perpetrators have been brought into ICC custody. Id. The ICC’s 
first ever trial, against Thomas Lubanga, was suspended because of the prosecution’s 
inability to disclose to the court potentially exculpatory information. Id. at 5); International
Criminal Court ‘Altered Behaviour’—UN, BBC NEWS.COM (May31, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10196907 (“So far no one has been convicted of alleged war 
crimes.”). 
 92. Interview by Patrick Smith with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC (Sept. 
21, 2009), available at http://www.theafricareport.com/index.php/200909213281793/news-
analysis/interview-luis-moreno-ocampo-icc-prosecutor-3281793.html (discussing progress in 
establishing an “international criminal justice system”). Moreno-Ocampo states that “Armies 
all over the world are adjusting to [the ICC].” Id.
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A certain amoral, professionalized version of justice is contained in the 
vision of international criminal tribunals, insofar as they exist in isolation 
from the more urgent question of how to prevent mass rape, torture, and 
killing from happening before they occur.93 It is certainly problematic for us 
to teach students that international justice exists primarily in the tribunal,
disregarding the general lack of an international response to events giving 
rise to the creation of that tribunal.94
Some have characterized what we call international law as more akin to 
religion or moralistic teaching—insofar as the basic logic of law qua law 
requires an enforcement arm that to some degree corresponds to the letter of 
the law itself.95 This debate over the validity of international law is as old as 
the discipline itself.96 While controversy over whether a particular national 
act is “contrary to international law” or not may at times seem sterile and 
meaningless, states do continue to engage in these arguments and so treat 
the imprimatur of international law as having some ultimate importance.97
 93. Id.
 94. For more philosophical doubts and dissatisfactions arising from efforts to 
prosecute perpetrators of large-scale killings and other war crimes, see Mark J. Osiel, Why 
Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 118 (2000). See Donna 
E. Arzt, Views of the Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal Tribunals in 
the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS, AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 226,
230 (2006) for more practical considerations as to the effectiveness of war crime tribunals; 
see James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities 
Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2009) (critiquing potential of ICC to 
prevent humanitarian atrocities); Richard Ashby Wilson, Judging History: The Historical 
Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 
908, 922 (2005). 
 95. See, e.g., Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (2006) (highlighting and explaining the 
enforcement gap and suggesting a new approach is necessary, while stating “traditional 
approaches to enforcement . . . are inadequate to meet the challenge of effectively realizing 
human rights in the twenty-first century”); Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human 
Rights Committee: An Argument for De-Marginalizing Enforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 211 (1998). 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 32 (listing criticisms of modern 
international legal system); HENKIN, supra note 77, at 1-5 (tracing the history of the role of 
sovereignty throughout international law). 
 97. Again, academic and popular literature on those criteria necessary to support a 
rule of customary international law, and the application of international law to specific acts 
by members of the international community is voluminous. See, e.g., TERRY NARDIN, LAW,
MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1983) (reviewing opposing positions on what is 
international law); Roberts, supra, note 36 (attempting to reconcile “traditional” and 
“modern” approaches to creating customary international law); Victor Kattan, The Legality 
of the West Bank Wall: Israel’s High Court of Justice v. The International Court of Justice,
40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1425 (2007) (discussing the debate over the wall’s legal status 
and comparing contradictory court rulings between the High Court of Israel and the ICJ); 
Anguel Anastassov, Are Nuclear Weapons Illegal? The Role of Public International Law and
the International Court of Justice, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 65 (2010) (outlining the 
debate of whether nuclear weapons are illegal under customary international law). Compare
Leon Sheleff, The Application of Israeli Law to the Golan Heights Is Not Annexation, 20
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On the other hand, the fact that enhanced norms of actual enforcement 
cannot develop without something akin to the clear consent of at least most 
nations would suggest that the international community is likely to go on 
wringing its hands in the face of even the most egregious violations of its 
supposedly non-derogable principles.98 The international law-making 
apparatus functions, if at all, like an unwieldy town meeting, with each bloc 
of participants holding the veto.99 Adoption of cost-free (because abstract) 
norms is attractive; adoption of implementing mechanisms and duties to act 
is much more problematic and nearly impossible to achieve in a still largely 
consensus—and consent—based system.100
Given the amount of time spent by legal scholars and diplomats arguing 
over the status of particular “pieces” of international law (is it yet customary 
international law, is it jus cogens?), it is discouraging to witness those 
instances where disputation over norms evaporates in the face of a violent 
reality.101 United Nations peacekeepers are often associated with such 
lapses—such as in the massacre of Srebrenica and in the Rwandan 
genocide.102 In Rwanda most dramatically, it quickly became clear that the 
role of the U.N. was to get the Europeans and Americans out, while leaving 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 333 (1994), with Asher Maoz, The Application of Israeli Law to the 
Golan Heights Is Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355 (1994). See also Iraq War Illegal, 
Says Annan, BBC NEWS.COM (Sept. 16, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3661134.stm 
(capturing thoughts of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan with respect to U.S.-led 
coalition’s invasion of Iraq). 
 98. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 136-37 (noting that U.N. Charter 
prohibition on unilateral intervention is authoritative and controlling despite past cases of 
humanitarian intervention); Malone, supra note 29 (questioning whether, due to lack of 
precedent, states should be barred from intervening in order to prevent or mitigate 
environmental and humanitarian disasters). Compare Jones, supra note 33, at 105-06 
(bemoaning the inability to create Security Council precedent for humanitarian intervention 
so long as China and Russia continue to exercise veto power in such instances), with Roberts, 
supra note 36, at 136-37 (stating belief of some international lawyers that NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo will establish a right to unilateral intervention). 
 99. See Roberts, supra note 36, at 28, 38 (citing Security Council veto power as one 
impediment to creation of certain international norms). 
 100. See Philip Alston and Bruno Simma, The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1992) 
(recognizing that, for some writers, the notion of “state practice” has turned into “paper 
practice”: “words, texts, votes and excuses” that contradict the external actions (or inaction) 
of states).  
 101. See generally Roberts, supra note 36 (attempting to reconcile traditional and 
modern forms of customary international law into coherent theory with which to move 
forward). 
 102. POWER, supra note 56, at 361 (describing bitter divide within U.N. Security 
Council over whether to term events taking place in Rwanda during the spring and summer 
of 1994 as “genocide”); id. at 406-30 (describing deliberate efforts by Clinton administration 
to avoid intervening in Bosnia despite reports of mass killings at Srebenica). 
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the incredulous Rwandans to their fate.103 It is apparent that the real sin in 
those cases was one of omission, and that it was the failure of militarily 
capable states to provide effective protection that led directly to the larger 
tragedy.104 As for the U.N., the image of those in the blue helmets stepping 
back while slaughter was being planned and executed was not only 
troublesome, but, in light of the fact that the U.N. represents the 
“international community” and its endless wrangling over international law 
norms, the ultimate irony.105
A. How International Law Gets Made 
In many ways, international law can hardly be called a legal system at 
all, except for the persistence of legal scholars in doing so.106 An especially 
challenging aspect of international law is that its evolving norms—that is to 
say, its very substantive content—is driven by both the consent and practice 
of sovereign states.107 Westphalian notions of sovereignty impede the 
development of international law along cleaner, more coherent lines.108
While no legal system is immune from irrationality, these defects are 
especially characteristic of international law.109 The conceptual dominance 
of sovereignty and its concomitant notion of state consent leave certain 
egregious violations unaddressed. This is true whenever there is a failure by 
 103. Id. at 352-53 (relating commands from head of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations 
Kofi Annan to General Dallaire with regards to maintaining neutrality and evacuating foreign 
nationals). 
 104. At the height of the Rwandan genocide in April-May, Dallaire’s forces were 
reduced from 2,500 to 2,100 and finally to 270 following U.N. Security Council 
authorization. POWER, supra note 56, at 352-53.  
 105. It is a matter of great interest that, as of this writing, the Security Council has 
decided (Russia, China, Brazil, India and Germany abstaining) to give approval to a no fly 
zone in Libya to protect Libyan rebels seeking the end of the Qaddafi regime. Far from 
indicating a sea change in international views of humanitarian intervention, one issue being 
heatedly discussed in what makes this conflict different from so many that have been 
essentially ignored by the international community. One factor that cannot be overlooked, of 
course, is the importance of Libyan oil and general strategic significance. Richard Falk, In 
Libya, Decoding an Uncertain Future, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/201182885646839710.html 
106. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether 
International Law is Law, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451 (2010); Murphy, supra note 32 
(attempting to identify the contemporary norms governing resort to war); ORFORD, supra 
note 70, at 72 (stating that international law appears to lack the familiar institutions of 
domestic law, and questioning whether international law is really law at all). 
 107. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
41-45 (2006) (listing state and international judicial practice as one factor in identifying 
peremptory norms).  
 108. See Louis Henkin, That ‘S’ Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human 
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999), for a discussion on the inapplicability of 
Westphalian notions of sovereignty to an increasing number of arenas—including 
international human rights, corporate responsibility and cyberspace. 
 109. See generally debate discussed in note 44, supra.
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states either to arrive at consensus as to the appropriate response or, more 
fundamentally, as to the nature of the unfolding events.110
On the one hand, ordinary “customary international law” is created 
through a process of broad state practice over time, combined with so-called 
opinio juris—the belief by the state that it is adhering to a rule because the 
rule is legally binding upon it. That is to say, the state believes the rule to 
reflect what the law really is (as opposed to merely a good or moral idea).111
This somewhat fanciful formulation reflects the implicit resistance of 
international lawyers to the accusation that international norms rest on a 
merely prescriptive sense of fairness, propriety, or global goodness. Outside 
of treaties and ordinary custom, there is another uber layer of rules, based 
upon the notion that jus cogens or peremptory norms are so basic, so 
fundamental, that it can be assumed no state would or could reject them.112
Such norms are non-derogable; they are inherently and unequivocally 
binding. It is often said that this branch of modern international law is based 
upon natural law, to the extent that as a source of rules, jus cogens norms 
are moral, right, and unquestionably beneficial. One problem, however, is 
that this “peremptory” quality extends only to the norm and not to its means 
of enforcement—which is often all but non-existent. A further problem is 
that this higher status of non-derogable norms means that there is a deep 
reluctance on the part of international and national tribunals to acknowledge 
or identify such norms.113 To the extent that jus cogens is a powerful term, it 
is only reluctantly affirmed.  
 110. See AREND & BECK, supra note 21, at 128-36 (arguing that norm prohibiting 
humanitarian intervention to remove tyrants is authoritative and controlling based on 
rejection of theory by states); id., at 136 (detailing Professor Tesón’s observations regarding 
this argument: “There must be something deeply wrong with an international legal system 
that protects tyrants like [Idi] Amin”); Scott Straus, Darfur and the Genocide Debate, 84 
FOREIGN AFF. 123, 125, (2005); Joyce Apsel, On Our Watch: The Genocide Convention and 
the Deadly, Ongoing Case of Darfur and Sudan, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 53, 54-55 (2008) (“[A] 
significant amount of time and energy was spent on debates over whether or not events in 
Darfur were ‘genocide’ and if the Genocide Convention applied, on recommendations to the 
Security Council, and on official and public condemnations—none of which stopped the 
momentum of escalating violence.”).  
 111. See Roberts, supra note 36, at 758-61 (introducing concept of opinio juris). 
 112. See id. at 761-63 for a discussion on the difference between legal (prescriptive) 
and moral (normative) imperatives to act and explaining difference between prescriptive, 
descriptive and normative actions. 
 113. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 107, at 545-50 (noting incorporation of jus 
cogens into national decisions in Israel, Britain and United States). Both the Eichmann and 
Pinochet cases are pivotal to the current debate over jus cogens crimes. In the United States, 
a growing body of law centered on delineating the limits of jus cogens and customary 
international law has emerged under the Alien Torts Claims Act, originally passed in 1798. 
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (ruling that illegal detention of 
defendant did not amount to a breach under law of nations); Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent 
Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 
238 (2d Cir 1995) (setting forth basis for an adequate pleading alleging violations of law of 
nations). 
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Several extraordinary facts about the formation of international law come 
together here: international law is still based largely on the consent of 
sovereign states—whether in treaty law or in the creation of customary 
international law, the latter involving a process that is less explicit and more 
mysterious than adoption of treaty obligations.114 A special class of super 
norms, the jus cogens norms, having to do with egregious violations of 
human rights, may be asserted without a full demonstration of state 
consent—or less provocatively, may be treated as so obvious to all that the 
process of demonstrating state consent becomes inherently irrelevant.115 On 
the other hand, even where jus cogens norms are recognized (and it has 
been pointed out that tribunals are reluctant to acknowledge the existence of 
these norms without a very firm foundation for doing so) the means of norm 
enforcement may nonetheless remain largely undeveloped.116 Despite these 
contradictions, international law scholars and international lawyers continue 
to assert that international law is law; it is not morality or secular religion 
but rather law as any other law, albeit with its own specialized 
characteristics.117
I have suggested that the gap between the promise and reality of 
international law is most obvious where an extremely vulnerable set of 
victims could with relative ease be saved by the international community, 
but where the international community conspicuously fails to act.118 This 
puts those insisting that international law is law—and as such guarantees a 
 114. Of the controversial nature of customary international law, British Diplomat 
Anthony Aust states:  
[T]here is no agreement on the criteria for identifying which norms 
of general international law have a peremptory [jus cogens] character 
. . . . Perhaps the only generally accepted example is the prohibition 
on the use of force as laid down in the UN Charter. The prohibitions 
on genocide, slavery and torture may also be said to be jus cogens . . 
. . [b]ut it would be rash to assume that all prohibitions contained in 
human rights treaties are jus cogens, or even part of customary 
international law.  
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 257 (2000).  
 115. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (listing those crimes 
outlawed as violating law of nations). 
 116. See Sloan, supra note 9, at 84-85 (indicating that current international system 
geared not towards accomplishing justice but rather non-intervention); c.f. Alexander, supra
note 94, at 5, 19-22 (assessing the relationship between the ICC and the United States and 
explaining complementarity doctrine). See id. at 5 (stating President Bush famously 
“unsigned” the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court in 2005); id. at 19 
(“ICC jurisdiction operates according to the complementarity doctrine, under which the 
Court will not exercise jurisdiction over a case unless the State(s) with original jurisdiction is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”). 
 117. See HENKIN, supra note 77, at 25-29 (arguing, essentially, that substance of 
international law should take precedence over form). 
 118. See supra notes 5, 7, 9, 10, 13 and accompanying text (suggesting inability of 
international legal system to create an enforceable set of rules governing responses to 
genocide and other atrocities committed by state and non-state actors). 
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certain minimum level of humanitarian protection—in a very uncomfortable 
position, necessitating intellectual gymnastics to preserve the fiction that 
this is indeed recognizably law, as opposed to aspiration. This pressure to 
vindicate the effectiveness and enforcement capability of international law 
in real time accounts, it can be argued, for the intense professional interest 
in structures like the International Criminal Court.119 International criminal 
tribunals in particular create a good deal of rhetorically pleasing 
“accountability,” by “ending impunity” and the like, whereas all of this 
legal activity generally takes place after numerous barbaric events have 
played out on the ground.120
IV. THE ULTRA-VULNERABLE AND A CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
This article has argued that claims of international law effectiveness have 
been consistently undermined by the failure of international law to provide 
basic guarantees of safety for the ultra vulnerable. One example of this 
global cohort of the “ultra-vulnerable” are children caught up in brutal, 
though generally low tech, civil wars. Since the adoption of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 1989,121 it has 
been often stated that children are now the holders of their own rights;122
 119. See Alexander, supra note 94, at 19-20 (discussing the ability of ICC to enforce 
international criminal laws); Smith, supra note 92 (discussing prospect of prosecuting and 
convicting various alleged war criminals). 
 120. See generally Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal 
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001) (arguing that ICTY and ICTR 
have contributed to peace-building in post-war societies by introducing international criminal 
accountability). But see STOVER, supra note 91, at 142-45 (summarizing thoughts of ICTY 
witnesses on international criminal tribunal process and sentences received by convicted 
criminals). See also id. at 142 (discussing that, in addition to certain, surprisingly-short 
prison sentences handed down by the ICTY, it is clear that the work of international criminal 
tribunals can in no way substitute for intervention into and prevention of horrific war 
crimes). 
 121. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter UNCRC]. 
 122. Earlier child rights documents focus simply on economic and social needs of the 
child delivered through the parent or family. Compare Declaration of Geneva, League of 
Nations Doc. A.127 (1924); Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354, arts. 25, 26 (Nov. 20, 1959); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), arts. 23, 24, 
21, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (Dec. 16, 1966); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
arts. 10, 21 U.N.GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966), 
with Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 12, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25, at 167 (Nov. 20, 1989) 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming 
his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all 
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
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they are no longer to be seen as appendages of the family or community.123
While there is no clear consensus on the hierarchy of rights within 
children’s rights as found in the UNCRC, it is apparent that there is 
something distinct and instinctual about the impulse to protect children from 
unnecessary suffering. To the extent that children are unable to analyze or 
influence their own fates to any appreciable degree, it falls to others—the 
non-children among us—to protect them from harm whenever possible. 
This responsibility to protect falls in obvious ways on families, communities 
and states, as well as on the international community. Failure to react 
effectively to the suffering of children may be seen as a particularly 
egregious form of indifference. 
In the late 1990s, Graca Machel described the chilling reality that civil 
conflicts raging in many parts of the post-Cold War world were not only 
dangerous and violent for children; in fact, these conflicts took as their 
specific objective terrorizing children through extreme forms of exploitation 
and brutalization.124 Targeting children as a means of intimidating 
communities had become a principal technique of waging war in the 
1990s.125 The damage was no longer incidental but instead intentionally 
directed at children. Territory could be controlled; villages could be cowed 
through a raw demonstration of power that eschewed any pre-existing 
notion to the effect that, even in warfare, there should be a bare minimum of 
humanistic behavior in the form of child protection.126 In the decade that 
followed publication of her report, a number of conflicts seemed to unfold 
according to the Machel playbook: children were raped, tortured, and killed 
and were also made to engage in this kind of behavior.127 Nothing short of 
the most brutalizing forms of indoctrination would do.128 Anti-government 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the 
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with 
the procedural rules of national law. 
Id. 
 123. See Maria Grahn-Farley, Foreword: Crossing Borders, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 657, 
659 (2002) (“The CRC is a unique human rights treaty, not only in its universality, but also 
in its paradigmatic shift from looking at the child as a passive object based on her needs to 
looking at the child as an active subject and bearer of her own rights.”). 
 124. Machel Report, supra note 76, ¶ 3.  
 125. Id.
 126. Id.
 127. See Baldauf, supra note 75.  
 128. See BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL REPORTING, Uganda’s Silent War (Dec. 20, 
2008), YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2008), at: 1:05/36:19,
http://www.youtube.com/user/TheBIRorg#p/u/20/j8ZxHQLA0ww (interviewing several 
children who were forced to brutally kill and rape other children in Uganda); DeNeen L. 
Brown, A Child’s Hell in the Lord’s Resistance Army, WASH. POST, May 10, 2006, at C1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/09/AR20060
50901907.html.
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militias, well aware of their own weakness in conventional terms, used 
children to augment their power through the sheer terror they could call 
forth in civilian populations by such systematic abuse.129 Destruction of the 
deepest human instinct to protect the very young became a weapon of war.  
While perhaps an obvious point, it should be noted that children and 
their immediate relatives have borne the brunt of this reality themselves. 
The U.N. may use its descriptive outlets to raise awareness of the problem, 
but the terror brought to bear against children has been experienced within 
particular communities.130 Those who make law and policy to address these 
situations do not themselves undergo any of the adverse effects. Much of 
this post-Cold War civil warfare has been extremely unsophisticated in 
military terms. There is little question about the inability of violent militias 
to stand up to the military power of any modern, organized army. 
Nevertheless, a striking characteristic of these conflicts is that they have 
continued in some cases literally for years, leading to tens of thousands of 
deaths.131
One of the most extreme examples of children being allowed to suffer 
needlessly was that of the Ugandan “night walkers,” children who had to 
sleep collectively in order to avoid being kidnapped or killed when in their 
homes. Many had to walk long distances every night in order to find safety 
in numbers at some common location.132 This nightly ritual went on for 
several years during a prolonged period of intense violence perpetrated by 
Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. As far as 
“evidence” is concerned, it is a simple matter to find video depictions of 
these children, marching joylessly out from their homes each night to 
shelter in overcrowded, dirty, and depressing buildings where they could 
 129. CHILD SOLDIERS REPORT, supra note 76. 
 130. See Ilene Cohn, The Protection of Children in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping 
Processes, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 129 (1999) (Despite increased international attention to 
and awareness of children’s rights, children are largely overlooked in the peacemaking and 
peacekeeping process. Rules of engagement for peacekeepers disregard children, and 
reconstruction and reconciliation programs that emerge from negotiations ignore the 
differential impact on and particular needs of children. The effect is to marginalize persistent 
problems like the rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers and, more broadly, to miss 
the opportunity to address widespread systemic problems common to war-torn societies.); 
Brown, supra note 128.  
 131. See, e.g., TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND 
THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY 64-65 (2006) (chronicling the atrocities in Uganda as 
including forcing children to kill their own parents, crushing babies’ and toddlers’ skulls or 
throwing them into fires, mutilating innocent civilians, and abducting and forcing girls and 
young women into sexual slavery). 
 132. See The Oprah Winfrey Show: Humanitarian Crisis, Harpo Productions, (Apr. 
26, 2006), available at http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/Humanitarian-Crisis/2; Jeevan
Vasagar, The Nightwalkers, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 10, 2006, § G2, at 10, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/feb/10/uganda.jeevanvasagar; John Goddard, 
Uganda’s Night Walkers, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 14, 2006, at A03, available at Westlaw, 
2006 WLNR 4226010. 
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attain some basic safety in numbers.133 Because of the brutal nature of the 
militia members’ behavior,134 the communities from which the children 
came could no longer protect them; they had no choice but to let their 
children go out on these forced marches each night. In the face of this 
prolonged and supremely unnecessary suffering (as compared, for instance, 
with the vexed situation of human rights violations in strong, heavily armed, 
totalitarian states like Burma or North Korea), it is hard to accept the fact 
that the international community took no organized steps to stop it—yet that 
is the case.135 News outlets could readily find the children and film them in 
their nightly misery, yet the international community could find no real, 
practical solution, even over the course of many years.  
Joseph Kony did not represent a state, and his military band numbered 
only in the hundreds. As military forces go, his was weak and 
unimpressive.136 It is not difficult to imagine ways in which the international 
community could have taken some direct action against Kony, such that he 
would have been at least deterred from his brutal crusade. Dozens of reports 
and studies were issued, and Kony’s outrages against the people of Northern 
Uganda were exhaustively detailed.137 However, as his actions were allowed 
by the international community to continue indefinitely, tens of thousands 
of refugees entered substandard government-run camps, and where villagers 
did remain in their home places, the children kept walking each night to 
comparative safety.138 Ugandan government-run refugee camps were 
notorious in their own way for violence and a generally dismal quality of 
life.139
 133. See, e.g., Journeyman Pictures, Abduction—Uganda, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2003), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kft07dZLpks.  
 134. See generally ALLEN, supra note 131.  
 135. Payam, Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of 
the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J INT’L L. 403, 404 
(2005) (describing the international community as “aloof” regarding the crisis in Uganda.); 
id. (“Given the absence of any vital national interests, influential states have not been 
inclined either to pressure Sudan to stop harboring the LRA or to help government forces 
confront the insurgents. Instead, the burden was placed on Uganda to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement with a ruthless, cult-like insurgency.”). 
 136. ALLEN, supra note 131, at 40.
 137. See e.g., Uprooted and Forgotten, HUM. RTS, WATCH (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/03/16/uprooted-and-forgotten; As If We Weren’t 
Human, HUM. RTS, WATCH (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/08/26/if-
we-weren-t-human. 
 138. ALLEN, supra note 131, at 53-54; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced
Persons, ¶1, Statement Submitted by Caritas Internationalis et al., U.N. Doc 
E/CN.4/2006/NGO/174 (Feb. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ECOSOC] (estimating the number of 
displaced persons at 1.7 million). 
 139. ALLEN, supra note 131, at 53-54. See also Abducted and Abused, HUM. RTS,
WATCH (July 14, 2003), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/12306/section/7; Uprooted and 
Forgotten, supra note 137.
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It is interesting that Joseph Kony is being sought by the Ugandan 
government, with the assistance of other governments,140so that he can be 
sent to prosecution to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. 
International lawyers are profoundly interested in the ICC, which has been 
active since 2002. In that time, the Court has spent “half a billion euros”141
and issued warrants for only a small number of criminal defendants.142
International prosecutions of war criminals have been controversial in 
countries where years of civil conflict have left the local populations 
decimated by violence and hunger. In the case of Uganda, there has been 
great fear that Kony’s flight from ICC prosecution could prolong and even 
revive the conflict.143 International law has been bullish on the creation of 
post-conflict tribunals; it has, by ironic contrast, been timid and resistant on 
the question of armed humanitarian intervention.144 In Uganda, as in other 
conflict situations, prosecuting militia leaders has often been debated in the 
context of peace-at-all-costs versus “justice,” as if the mere fact of criminal 
prosecution after many years of neglected conflict aptly represented 
justice.145 This article will not revisit the broader debate over the desirability 
of peace versus justice, one of the grand themes of academic writing on 
“transitional justice.” However, one aspect of justice must surely be to
prevent suffering where possible, and in such conflicts, prevention appears 
to be far more possible than the reaction of the international community has 
indicated. In this sense, we might posit a responsibility to intervene where 
there is a likelihood of success—that is, where there would be no significant 
countervailing threat to international peace and security arising from the 
intervention. 
 140. See generally Caroline Ayugi & Peter Eichstraedt, The ICC Wants Joseph Kony 
Leader of the Lords Resistance Army (May 23, 2008), 
http://miafarrownews.blogspot.com/2008/05/icc-wants-joseph-kony-leader-of-lords.html; Joe 
Bavier, Waiting for the Americans: Dungu, PULTIZER CTR. ON CRISIS REPORTING (Sept. 10, 
2010), http://pulitzercenter.org/blog/untold-stories/waiting-americans-dungu.  
 141. See Press Release, ICC Watch, The ICC: Half a Billion Euros, For What?, (Mar. 
3, 2010), available at http://www.iccwatch.org/pdf/Press%20Release%203Mar10.pdf.  
 142. See All Cases, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2011) (detailing the “situations” in which the ICC is involved). 
 143. Josefine Volqvartz, ICC under Fire over Uganda Probe, CNN (Feb. 23, 2005), 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/02/23/uganda.volqvartz (quoting Jan Egeland, 
U.N. humanitarian emergency coordinator, characterizing/describing? the conflict as “one of 
the world’s most neglected crises”). 
 144. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: WHY ACCOUNTABILITY 
MATTERS FOR PEACE 35- 92 (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0709webwcover_3.pdf.  
 145. Compare Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC, Address at Building a Future 
on Peace and Justice International Conference (June 25, 2007), available at
http://www.peace-justice-conference.info/download/speech%20moreno.pdf, with Lucy Hovil 
& Joanna R. Quinn, Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda 50-
52 (Refugee Law Project, Working Paper No. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.refugeelawproject.org/working_papers/RLP.WP17.pdf.pdf 
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A. International Lawyers, the Nuremberg Illusion and International 
Criminal Tribunals 
Since international law is relatively strong on norm production (even 
taking into account constraints on the development of norms demanded by 
the methods of customary international law, as described above) and 
extremely weak on enforcement and implementation, this leaves an 
unsatisfying state of affairs for international lawyers. Lawyers with a public 
international portfolio resist the idea that international law is merely 
exhortation or moralizing, and seek wherever possible to establish 
equivalence between international law and “real” law.146 Since military 
action carried out to protect the vulnerable from violations of their 
international rights would demand intense political advocacy, and entail at 
least some risks in implementation, international lawyers have turned 
instead to a formalized, ritualized version of norm enforcement—the 
international criminal trial. Recent international criminal tribunals have 
been based loosely on the “Nuremberg” model—the trial of Nazi war 
criminals after the allied victory World War II.147 The authors of the 
Nuremberg judgment took pains to convince an international audience that 
the criminal trials were not merely manifestations of victors’ justice, but 
represented the collective will of the international community, applying real 
law to real criminal defendants.148 The difference between Nuremberg and 
the more recent tribunals, of course, is that in World War II real armies first 
took on the Nazis, and the criminal trials took place only after the war had 
been won through actual intervention of the strongest kind—not after the 
war had been allowed to simply “run its course.”149 Rulings of the 
international tribunals set up in the wake of conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone have all been extensively mined for 
nuggets of international criminal law.150 Such jurisprudential views, 
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Nations, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205 (2008). 
 147. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 193, 205 (2d 
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with, Nuremburg). 
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however, reflect the situation after brutal conflict has subsided and after 
thousands have suffered and died who might have been protected from that 
fate had international law forthrightly embraced a doctrine like 
humanitarian intervention and/or the responsibility to protect. There may 
well be situations in which nations are fearful of huge investments in blood 
and treasure, and ultimate lack of success, but with respect to many 
conflicts, it would seem that relatively modest involvement by outside 
forces to stop bloodshed, if not to topple governments or engage in nation 
building, might have yielded significant results.151 And yet, such efforts are 
only rarely made.152
The debate over whether international law allows for unilateral or even 
group humanitarian intervention is real and vibrant, if often overly technical 
in nature.153 However, it is treated as an arcane and generally non-urgent 
question to be sorted out over a very long timeline of real-world events and 
academic writing. Interest in international criminal tribunals is far less 
ambiguous, however. International lawyers engage fully with the idea of 
international criminal tribunals, set up under the auspices of the 
international community.154 International crimes are parsed, the relevant 
criminals identified, and the proper procedures pondered. The ICC, for all 
the academic analysis it has engendered, has spent a huge amount of money 
and only brought a handful of defendants to trial as of this writing.155 Yet, 
its chief prosecutor has insisted that the mere fact of its existence will 
“change the world” and act as the ultimate deterrent, even for the type of 
incorrigible war criminal involved in brutal civil wars.156 However 
implausible that claim, this is the belief that drives interest in the 
international criminal tribunals and sustains belief in the relatively inactive 
ICC. 
There is nothing inherently objectionable about the establishment of 
international criminal tribunals. Indeed, the proliferation of these tribunals is 
often cited as a sign that the enforcement aspect of international law is 
 151. GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 224, 228
(1995).
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becoming more credible.157 U.S. failure to participate in the treaty 
establishing the ICC is taken, by contrast, as an indication of U.S. resistance 
to the encroachment of international law on U.S. military activities.158 What 
is troublesome, however, is that international lawyers appear to endorse this 
over-emphasis on criminal tribunals, by contrast to the at best anemic 
response to real-time rape and slaughter of vulnerable populations, even by 
low tech, poorly armed, and disorganized bands of marauding militias.159
The mobilization of legal elites around the idea of international tribunals 
gives rise to an uncomfortable suspicion that international legal scholars are 
mistaking norm creation and abstract prosecution for effective intervention 
or at least substituting norm analysis for international law reform 
advocacy.160 At their worst, the international criminal tribunals, which are of 
such interest to international lawyers, perversely provide cover for the fact 
that international law has little to offer the most vulnerable populations 
when it comes to actual protection against real threats to life and safety.161
It is nearly ten years since the appearance of Samantha Power’s book, A
Problem from Hell, in which she excoriated the United States for its 
historical indifference to instances of genocide around the world. She was 
not the first to point out that there was little political cost associated with 
turning a blind eye to genocide, nor the first to note American and European 
hypocrisy in these matters.162 The examples of Cambodia, the Balkans, and 
Rwanda could not be clearer, and, as presented by Power, show the degree 
to which political elites in the U.S. and elsewhere were more worried about 
the adverse consequences of direct involvement than what inevitably 
happens to vulnerable populations under extreme threat.163 One would like 
to think that at least the international community broke its own rules when it 
looked the other way and allowed the Rwandan genocide and other 
slaughters to proceed.164 The fact, though, is that even with regard to what 
should be a very clear point of agreement, no solid international law has had 
an opportunity to crystallize. There is no generally recognized responsibility 
to protect civilians not within one’s own borders, even when the act of 
 157. See Ellis, supra note 16, at 119. 
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protection would be relatively easy and the type of suffering that would be 
prevented is grave and extensive.165
It certainly matters which phrase we use to describe the international 
right and/or duty to take meaningful action when the lives of civilians are at 
serious risk from immediate violence, in situations where the state in which 
these civilians live is unwilling or unable to respond in a protective way. 
The drafters of the report on the Responsibility to Protect might well have 
framed the issue as they did from a desire to remove the entire problem 
from the sterile debate over the U.N. Charter’s proscription on the use of 
force, and bring it instead into mainstream thinking over human rights and 
the widely accepted diminution of state sovereignty in that arena. On the 
other hand, the idea of a broadly embraced exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force has a more robust quality to it and could more squarely and 
explicitly help to remove scruples that arise when the international 
community is faced with the problem of when and how to act in the face of 
mass atrocities. As explained above, perhaps a duty of humanitarian 
intervention would capture both the requirement to take meaningful action 
and the sense that military force (as opposed to mere dialogue or threats) 
would be involved. 
The virtue of the designation Responsibility to Protect is that it 
encompasses situations outside of regular warfare and so has broader 
potential for principled application. As for what the children’s rights 
dimension adds to this discussion, the readiest answer is that where there are 
massive and deliberate violations of children’s rights, there is a heightened 
sense of egregiousness. In instances of extreme vulnerability, it seems 
completely unreasonable to expect that civilians should have to wait for 
conflict to “run its course” before the international community takes action. 
An urgent duty on the international community to come up with strong 
protective structures would seem in such cases beyond dispute. Where such 
indicia of extreme vulnerability are present, any system of “law” should 
certainly be required to offer a clear remedy in the form of unambiguous 
prevention.  
 165. See generally Payandeh, supra note 31. 

